Tuesday, 29 January 2008

One America(s) in 2009? The Bush Legacy

One America(s) in 2009? The Bush Legacy

After hailing 2007 as the “year of engagement” with the Americas, the Bush administration this week claimed that 2008 will be a “year of partnership”. If the hemispheric agenda that President Bush promoted during last year’s visits to key regional allies was representative of ‘engagement’ however, then we should not expect much ‘partnership’ in the coming year. In fact, the plans for 2008 look set only to reinforce divisions that are emerging in the Western Hemisphere. The Bush administration will leave a momentous task of rebuilding regional unity for its successor in 2009.

The Bush administration has revealed two major objectives in Latin America for 2008. Neither is particularly original nor surprising. Firstly, it seeks to preserve its predominant position of influence in the region. The four pillars of it’s policy – consolidate democracy, promote prosperity, invest in people, and protect the security of democratic states – are, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Thomas A. Shannon affirmed, ways to maintain such influence. The hegemonic project has been far from a complete success. The inevitable resistance to American influence has developed to a degree that threatens a fundamental schism in the region. Rather than concentrating efforts on enticing adversaries back into its orbit, the lack of an immediate contender to U.S. regional leadership has led the Bush administration to focus resources on key allies. Bush’s March 2007 tour was restricted to these ‘key allies’ and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice appears to be furthering these links in 2008 with follow-up visits. Despite continued rhetoric about hemispheric solidarity, this partial campaign has only facilitated the division in differing ‘ways of life’. Rice stated this week that the President had “a positive agenda for each and every one of our allies.” The aim is to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation with the U.S., but the choice of the likes of Colombia and Guatemala as exemplar allies shows that the Bush administration has again destroyed American credibility by backing the wrong horses.

This cooperation with questionable allies has also destroyed any chance of success in pursuing its second hemispheric priority. U.S. relationships with regional partners are considered a fundamental part of global strategy. The Bush administration has sought to demonstrate the successful adoption of American models of government and development in Latin America that can serve as an example to the rest of the world. The “unique challenge” that Shannon identifies for the Bush administration is to “[cement the] linkage between democracy and development and [show] that democracy can indeed deliver the goods, but also that development can be democratic.” This objective is not only vital for the credibility of American influence in Latin America, but also in the wider world. Shannon expresses that so far, it is only in the Americas that such a challenge has been taken on. Meeting this particular challenge would be a springboard for the more difficult areas of the world where U.S. influence is waning. The Bush administration has learned the difficult lesson that coercive power is insufficient for maintaining global primacy. It has sought to reemphasise democracy, prosperity, development and security as the core of its global hegemonic project. However, its limited interpretation of these principles has not only undermined hemispheric plans, but as a result, it also threatens to derail global strategy.

The Bush administration has set about demonstrating how democracy can bring development by focusing on free trade agreements with democratically elected allies in Latin America. The current priority has been to secure passage through U.S. Congress of the negotiated Colombian Free Trade Agreement. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice took 10 key Democratic leaders to visit Colombia this week in an effort to bring the agreement to a vote. “The first priority,” Shannon noted of the visit, “is to win over Congress to the Colombian Free Trade Agreement.” The second, he continued, “is to demonstrate the role of Colombia in a broader strategic approach to the Americas.” Shannon highlighted the critical role that Colombia had in showing how a democratic state can deliver the goods of social and economic development. He hoped that it would provide a strategic platform to extend free trade agreements beyond the Western Hemisphere. The promotion of free trade has been at the core of the Bush administration’s approach to development and winning this intellectual battle has taken on regional and global significance. The Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, Daniel Sullivan, reiterated the oft-cited argument that the free trade agreements are a win-win situation. The battle is far from won though. The prioritisation of economic growth has yet to demonstrate an ability to deal with the wider Latin America agenda of tackling poverty and extreme inequality. The U.S. Agency for International Development recognises that 80% of the Colombia’s rural population lives below the poverty line. Measures in the Free Trade Agreement however, such as the deregulation of American investments and increased dumping of surplus American agricultural produce, are only likely to exacerbate the situation for rural dwellers. Such concerns have led many to question the Bush administration’s ‘everybody wins’ argument and accuse it of pursuing its own economic interests.

Nonetheless, whilst the administration has repeatedly stressed that this engagement will bring economic benefits to Colombia, it has also been eager to suggest that it will also enhance democracy. Shannon noted that the administration is working with partners in the region to consolidate common political values, such as “democracy, respect for human rights, and open societies.” Rice was quick to declare that Colombia is one of the U.S.’ “strongest allies in this critical region,” but many Democrats in Congress have found Colombian President Uribe’s efforts to consolidate “common values” to be inadequate. The Democratic leadership in Congress continues to oppose the Free Trade Agreement, whilst Colombian “democracy” does not extend to guarantees of basic human rights and continues to uphold impunity for many paramilitary abusers. Human Rights Watch continues to warn of the highest global rate of trade unionist killings under the Uribe government. Even the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor reported last year on a number of Colombian government human rights abuses: unlawful and extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; insubordinate military collaboration with criminal groups; torture and mistreatment of detainees; overcrowded and insecure prisons; arbitrary arrest; high number of pretrial detainees some of whom were held with convicted prisoners; impunity; an inefficient judiciary subject to intimidation; harassment and intimidation of journalists; unhygienic conditions at settlements for displaced persons, with limited access to health care, education, or employment; corruption; harassment of human rights groups; violence against women, including rape; child abuse and child prostitution; trafficking in women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation; societal discrimination against women, indigenous persons, and minorities; and illegal child labor.

Yet Secretary Rice asserts that Colombia has “transformed itself.” Further economic engagement, she argues, gives the U.S. an opportunity to talk with a democratically elected ally that is “trying to do the right thing.” In response to accusation of Colombian paramilitary abuses against trade unionists, Shannon has also stressed that Uribe has made significant strides in his “democratic security” agenda. Whether this is a plan to secure democracy or to maintain security of a democratically elected government is unclear. “I think they want a healthy democracy,” Shannon suggested. Despite many of the facts on the ground, Shannon was willing to accept the Uribe administration’s promises that it was “trying” to guarantee labour rights. Such trust is unlikely to be afforded to other democratically elected leaders in the region, such as Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales. It is illuminating that added to the end of his list of common political values that the U.S. sought to foster; Shannon also stated that the Bush administration hoped to “make concrete a common understanding of what generates economic opportunity and prosperity.” It is this linking of limited concepts of democracy as elected representative governments and development as the adoption of economic liberalism that has been a central feature of the American hegemonic project. Whilst the U.S. has continued to build a preponderance of power, it has often recognised the need to construct a more consensual acceptance of its position of unipolarity. It has sought to build a common identity of the Western Hemisphere and the ‘Free World’ under American leadership based upon shared values of political freedoms that do not extend to popular control of the economic sphere or opportunities to oppose the U.S. However, the insistence of Secretary Rice that “the story of Colombia is one that is inspirational, inspirational in the region and inspirational in the world” is one example of why resistance grows towards American hegemony. Like so many historic cases of American ‘model’ states, the “shining example” of Colombia is not going to shed inspirational light on neighbouring Latin American antagonists and it certainly will not reach to the Middle East. The next occupant of the White House will have to embark upon a radically different course to reinstall American influence in the region and foster a genuine unity.



1 comments:

patmack said...

Your exposure of Columbia's governmental misconduct shows Bush's cynical acceptance of a world gone wrong.

Washington's propaganda to hide this inconvenient truth only puts the lie to Bush's efforts.

He only has a few months left in office but he seems determined to use them to make it impossible for the future U.S. government to take the high road. A good thing, maybe?